Suggesting cultural analysis of the phenomenon of globalization needs to take into account more than studies of subjectivity and communications technology, the author suggests a deconstructive methodology that seeks reconciliation of postmodernism with structuralism and idealism with materialism. Demonstrating points of contact between various social actors in the globalization arena, a sketch is made of the state as a pluralist agent articulating the process of globalizing capital. Motivations to globalize are said to point to a real social by which the political structure of the state is revealed. Subversion of the dominant discourse through self-determined practices of liberty are suggested as a means of constructing alternatives to global capital.
An opportunity exists for communications and cultural scholars to contribute more poignant critiques to the discourse of globalization of capital and suggest more effective strategies of resistance to capitalist hegemony. To date, analysis of globalization from these perspectives has tended to focus mainly on communications infrastructures and individual consumption habits. This has tended to portray globalization rather one-dimensionally as a program of forced consumption of branded consumer goods through monopolized networks of delivery. A general theme of technological determinism runs through much of such work. In this often caricaturized but typical theoretical premise, selfish, evil people are using technology to create a global feeding frenzy of consumerism that threatens to spin out of control, undermining national identities and corresponding institutions that supposedly bind citizens together. Many influential writers have gone to great length to show how globalization driven by the communication industries is resulting in a weakening of state sovereignty to the benefit of corporations.
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Convincing and relevant as their arguments may be, this technological determinism cannot provide a thoroughly satisfying explanation of the entire globalization phenomenon. It is erroneous to interpret the willful dismantling of the welfare state and concurrent Thus, the technological determinist argument provides only a partial explanation of globalization. Commodification, consumerism, and an understanding of the political economy of communication are important contributions in describing the culture of capitalism, but there is a need to acknowledge culturally specific social constructions behind this behavior as important cultural artifacts in and of themselves. This means not just analyzing the products of the state and its appendages but also understanding the elements that go to produce cultural forms in the first place. As Carey (1989) puts it, there is a need "to examine the actual social process wherein significant symbolic forms are created, apprehended, and used" (p. 30) . In looking at the globalization of capitalism, this means acknowledging that it is a phenomenon that belongs to our own Western capitalist cultural formation, in which we, inside the dominating nation-states, play a vital part and have a vested interest, both morally and materially. In particular, theorizing a pluralist nation-state with various motivations to articulate globalizing processes through various actions is necessary to develop a sophisticated description of globalization as a cultural phenomenon. Identifying points of contact between various actors in the globalization process can help to distinguish where (in terms of location) practices of resistance may be articulated. Finally, understanding globalization as part of capital's aspiration to totality is important but equally so is the recognition that acquisition through expansion is itself an inherent motivation of capital. The totalizing project is never complete; it is part of what keeps capitalism dynamic and therefore is better represented in discourse as one of the many processes of capitalist articulation rather than a static structure.
Important to this theorizing is the adoption of a slightly modified terminology to describe political behavior in the context of the state. I use the term motivation rather than interest to describe the driving force behind globalization, to emphasize the humanness of the actors who will to power through the state apparatuses, and to describe the humanness of people who oppose those who seek to dominate them. This recognizes the agency of individuals within these systems, individuals who often act irrationally, motivated by tribalism, loyalty, habit, and faith as much as rational self-interest. Writing in terms of motivations interrupts the dominant language of capitalism, which prefers to speak of rational competitive interests within or against a reified concrete social structure. Discussing motivations instead accommodates an understanding of the state itself as being driven by differently motivated actors through a multiplicity of institutions. In other words, it accommodates the description of the state as pluralist.
I write of points of contact to emphasize that social arenas are places of formal engagements between social actors. Rather than reify a notion of homogenization and equality between competing motivations in an assumed neutral social arena, describing points of contact descriptively accommodates unequal power relationships and allows distinct autonomous identification within social formations. This borrows from Clifford's notion of cosmopolitical con-tact zones (Morley, 2000, p. 9) . Organizational and governmental systems are rooted in movement and mobility of goods and people and in the transportation and temporality of both political and cultural economy. Points of contact between actors-sites of interaction-are not permanent locales, but they are sites defined by power dynamics when and where they manifest. This provides at least a partial answer to the riddle of "where to locate the production of oppression" (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 211) .
A Pluralist Methodology
A cultural perspective almost inevitably turns to textual analysis and incorporates the tools of postmodernism and critical deconstruction. Postmodernism in particular presents a challenge to theorists wishing to construct a completed or all-encompassing model to point out its weaknesses and strengths. By highlighting the impossibility of such grand narratives, postmodern theory is often scornfully dismissed as irrelevant because it seems to deny the possibility of closure or completion. Such responses may only indicate a lack of will to critically engage the self-reflexive personal issues of power and authority raised by postmodernist critiques. Dismissal of postmodernism on the grounds that nonarbitrary closure is impossible is an ironically poor argument that only goes to prove the point that all closures are arbitrary. Furthermore, it is just bad scholarship in that it does not address the epistemological crisis postmodernism illustrates. On postmodernism, Hardt and Negri (2000) wrote the following: "The deconstruction of the . . . spectral reign of globalized capitalism, reveals the possibility of alternative social organizations" (p. 48). A postmodernist critique of globalization and the state presents a serious challenge to integrate plurality of analyses and strategies of resistance. For example, Cleaver describes autonomous Marxism as having "evolved in such a way as to answer the postmodern demand for the recognition of difference and the Marxist insistence on the totalizing character of capital" (Dyer-Witheford, 1999, p. 189 ). The effect is detotalizing totalization, an analysis that better describes the complexity and sophistication of capital's command of society, allowing its conceptual dissolution into a more multivariate but at the same time, mottled order.
The modern nation-state creates expectations of modernity, including the concept of a concrete power structure. "These concepts reify sovereignty in the most rigid way; they make the relation of sovereignty into a thing (often by naturalizing it) and thus weed out every residue of social antagonism" (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 95) . Along the same lines as a technological determinist view, this is problematic because it fails to adequately address the embodiment of power in social actors, instead reifying a notion of power embedded in a nonexistent structure. This is perhaps an easy mistake to make given the conflated relation in the modern nation-state of bounded territoriality (including infrastructural edifices) to sovereignty and legitimacy (Held et al., 1999) . Though it refuses to go away, this is certainly not a recent issue:
Since the state is the concrete form of a productive world and since the intellectuals are the social element from which the governing personnel is drawn, the intellectual who is not firmly anchored to a strong [local] economic group will tend to present the State as an absolute. (Gramsci, 1997, p. 117) Given the comparative mobility of the unanchored intellectual, the institutional infrastructure of the state-its bureaucratic structure and material institutional aspects-creates the impression that the state is rooted and permanent because the subjective experience of the intellectual is always in motion. The limitations of this type of theorizing about the state are most evident in the theoretical impossibility of changing or resisting such a monolithic entity without the agglomeration of a greater brute physical force. In denying subjective agency, it also fails to address the ways in which people are often complicit in assisting and maintaining their own oppression. A poststructural understanding of power is the key.
Building on the adage that knowledge is power in contemporary Western society, Lyotard (1996) wrote that in the postmodern condition, knowledge is most simply a language game that is guided by a particular type of logic. Resistance to domination in this context comes from destabilizing the rules (or logic) that control the discourse. In terms of resistance to the globalization of capital, we should thus see authoritarian actors in the absolutist modern nation-state as primarily seeking to define the terms of existence in all areas of life. This is the totalizing motivation for the spread of capitalist dominance. The points of contact between the agents of capital and those they seek to colonize through their discourse are thus sites of struggle. Huws (1999) provides an example of this type of language game:
A new orthodoxy is in the making, an orthodoxy in which it becomes taken for granted that "knowledge" is the only source of value, that work is contingent and delocalizable, that globalization is an inexorable and inevitable process and that, by implication, resistance is futile and any assertion of the physical claims of the human body in the here-and-now is hopelessly old-fashioned. The implications of this emerging "common sense" are immense. Capable of shaping issues as diverse as taxation, employment legislation, levels of welfare spending, privacy rights and environmental policy, these notions serve to legitimise a new political agenda and set the scene for a new phase of capital accumulation. (p. 30) We can see in Huws's writing the flow from defining the term of common sense, or the dominating rules of discourse, to formal materialization of the dominant order through state policy. In this flow, the state acts to primarily define and then articulate the relations decided through its discourse.
Looking at Hall's (1999) seminal "Encoding, Decoding," the state establishes itself as the authority in a given discourse by constructing an oppositional or deviant Other, who will always be presented as proof of the dominant order's legitimacy. By naturalizing a relationship of authority and subservience, 2 this exemplifies the nature of hegemony in which the power of the state is demonstrated by rational knowledge, thereby justifying a commonsense understanding of its dominance. Derrida identifies this oppositional relationship in terms of boundary maintenance and warns us not to think of this as simply a binary relationship of dominance and subordination that can be easily flipped around (Hassard, 1993) . Rather, the dominant and subordinate characteristics are constituted as inherent in the terms themselves, so that dominant will always invoke a hierarchical relationship whether it appears along with the term subordinate or not. The language game thus demands that we define terms in such a way as to understand their relation to the processes of domination and subordination in all contexts.
In defining the state for this article, it is helpful to keep in mind that Piaget's (1970) basic criteria for social structures include flexibility, adaptability, and transformability. A structural analysis of the state thus begins with the understanding that it is never a static institution. Rather, the state is malleable, a floating nexus of relationships between people and ideas. Althusser's (1971) work on the state apparatuses and their role in interpellating ideology helps explain the pluralism of the state. The inclusion of institutions of civil society into the state (Althusser, 1971) , potentially theorized as the public sphere, make it difficult to deny that plural motivations are always present within the state. Beyond a narrow instrumentalist definition in which the state is portrayed simplistically as a tool of a monolithic ruling elite, the state, through the acts of the individuals and institutions that comprise it, defines and articulates various policies into the world because of a variety of motivations.
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The state is the dominant social arena of interrelations governing a specified territory, resulting in lived articulations of power within that space and in other territories where the state may have influence. 4 As already stated, globalization is indicative of the capitalist motivation to totalize. Globalization, an incarnation of expansionism, is something that states "do." Globalization is a discourse being articulated into the everyday world by states. This itself is influenced by a chorus of motivations, mainly military, economic, cultural, and humanitarian. Through colonialism, industrialism of all sorts has always been a global proposition. Globalization represents the process of expansion of capitalist systems in a contemporary context. To better understand the nature of this process, it is necessary to examine closer the motivating factors mentioned above.
Exploring globalization as a process driven by motivations requires that one first understand that this entails a reconciliation of sorts between the traditionally binary contest of materialism versus idealism. Recognizing the pluralism of motivations behind the state and globalization suggests a need to accommodate a pluralist analytical approach. Even Baudrillard (1983) , who describes us as hopelessly stuck in simulacra, acknowledges that there is a real somewhere behind it all. I am suggesting that we can identify the motivations for the material activity of globalizing as a real social, identified in a resulting set of practices that indicate a relatively stable set of relations. The acts of negotiating terms are inseparable from the actualization of those policies. Motivations outline the existence of social constructs. This is not to revert to a crass structuralism but rather to affirm the dialectical relationship between the processes of definition and the materialization of the resulting power relations in the real world. On the other hand, the material motivations at play also demand recognition.
It is not hard to understand the importance of Marx's basic premise that we find ourselves in conditions we have not chosen for ourselves. This being the case, all peoples must begin from where they find themselves. Foucault's (1999) affirmation that "liberty is a practice" (p. 135) is helpful but not liberatory in itself. As de Certeau (1988) explains, tactical maneuvers in the spatial territory of capital may prove bothersome but are more like a mosquito on a beast and are not of themselves a long-term strategy for self-determining one's own conditions. Capitalism is not something external to us in Western civilization. Only a conscious, coordinated, and prolonged effort to instill emancipatory and egalitarian practices in everyday life can give us the result of liberation in our material existence. It bears keeping in mind that oppression is a power relationship more or less directly related to the word game by which we define the rules of production, consumption, and accumulation and, hence, with potential material manifestations. In contrast, exploitation is a very physical act of expropriating the labor of others. The dialectical connection between the two is obvious, indicating how I reconcile idealism with materialism for the purpose of this investigation. The human body is the location of transcending dualism (O'Neill, 1989) . Hunger is obviously not a simulacrum, though the abstract circumstances surrounding it might very well be.
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As a final note on idealism and materialism, it should be recognized that petty rewards of capital are often irresistible to both politicians and hungry populations alike, but for very different reasons. On one hand, there is a will to gain status, stability, and power by identifying with the dominating order, whereas on the other hand, there is a very basic and real need for food, shelter, and medicine. This disparity of material conditions highlights the need to recognize the existence of material and ideological colonialism as part of the same articulating process. One cannot be arbitrarily made to take precedence over the other. Instead, emphasis on one or the other should be a strategic decision based on the circumstances in which one chooses to do battle. The phenomenon of accepting rewards for supporting implementation of neoliberal policies may at first appear straightforward but may be motivated by very different circumstances for different social actors.
Having elaborated a methodology that accommodates the plurality of the state and its motivating factors for the process of globalization, I now turn to an example of how to apply this to the discourse(s) of globalization.
Deconstructing Global Motivations
Earlier I described military, economic, cultural, and humanitarian issues as motivations for the state to articulate the discourse of globalization. By exam-ining each of these motivations in their turn, one can deconstruct much of the discourse of globalization and identify six key points of contact between actors in the global and national arenas. The following analysis is not meant to be an exhaustive study of any of the motivations identified, nor should the points of contact identified be considered conclusive. Rather, the aim is to provide a hypothetical framework for further examination and demonstrate how to identify the points of contact between the people involved in the process where disruptions to the dominant discourse might be inserted (see Appendix A). I emphasize that what qualifies as a disruption will take on different characteristics as the context of the motivation changes. For example, the assertion of selfdetermination by Zapatistas in Chiapas, Mexico, takes the principle form of armed military resistance to the enactment of changes to the Mexican constitution. At the same time, the issue of self-determination for aboriginal peoples in Canada is mainly fought out through court challenges and negotiations between governments. Of course, neither situation is composed only of one extreme or the other, but in all cases, there is a social dynamic involving a will to dominate and a will to self-determine the conditions of existence. A convenient starting point for further analysis is the military motivation.
Military Force
Several writers have developed theories of globalization as a military enterprise. Noam Chomsky's career of detailing the spread of U.S. influence through imperialism and direct military force are the typical primer for reading on this subject. Dealing more directly with globalization, Hardt and Negri (2000) have described the emergence of a globalizing empire with the United States as its vanguard:
Empire is emerging today as the center that supports the globalization of productive networks and casts its widely inclusive net to try to envelop all power relations within its world order-and yet at the same time it deploys a powerful police function against the new barbarians and the rebellious slaves who threaten its order. The power of Empire appears to be subordinated to the fluctuations of local power dynamics and to the shifting, partial juridical orderings that attempt, but never fully succeed, to lead back to a state of normalcy in the name of the "exceptionality" of the administrative procedures. (p. 20) In Hardt and Negri's description, the military aspect of the empire serves to enforce the policy decisions made by supranational organizational bodies, such as the United Nations. These bodies are under the tremendous hegemonic influence of the United States, which establishes the United States' normative terms of international policy. Though somewhat underdeveloped as a theory, Hardt and Negri locate power in their description as a "series of powers that regulate themselves and arrange themselves in networks" (p. 162). One might speculate that this is an attempt to reconcile a postmodern understanding of power with a rather structuralist description of the world. What is missing from their work in this regard is a stronger explanation of the hegemonic institutional relationships that form this so-called series of powers. Robinson (1996) explains a convincing Gramscian theory of hegemony that helps to understand the position taken by Hardt and Negri (2000) :
Hegemony is a social relation which binds together a "bloc" of diverse classes and groups under circumstances of consensual domination, such that subordinate groups give their "spontaneous consent" to "the direction imposed on social life" by the dominant groups. (Robinson, 1996, p. 22) In Robinson's interpretation, hegemony describes a consensual agreement to a relationship of dominance and subordination. In regard to empire, there is a consensual agreement to terms dictated by the United States. The military force is always ready to police the agreement, protecting against any serious threats to the dominant discourse. Being the globe's only military superpower and with NATO at its side (even in spite of petty dissent from within NATO), the hegemonic pressure the United States is thus able to exert because of its enormous punitive capacity is unchallengeable for most nations and even, as played out in Iraq, incontrovertible by the United Nations. As Strange (1989) writes, "because the United States has more actual and potential structural power than any other political authority in the international system, its power in the system is undiminished" (p. 164). She continues to say that "asymmetric structural power has allowed the United States to break the rules with impunity and to pass the consequent risks and pains of adjustment on to others" (p.165). There are few indicators of power as strong as the ability to break the rules with impunity, which constitutes a direct attack on the system if carried out by any but the dominant actor in the arena. Robinson's (1996) notion of bloc power-hegemonic international formations based on the former West versus East, capitalism versus communism demarcations-is also useful in further understanding the military motivation for globalization. In keeping with this notion, Shaw (2000) develops a theory of an emerging global state out of the cold war Western bloc alliance. Lacking territoriality, Shaw's theory of a supranational state cannot meet the criteria set out in this article for statehood, but his explanation of the economic order that emerged as a result of the cold war does indicate a point of contact between motivating factors for globalization. Shaw presents the concept of total war as a key motivation for the establishment of the state as economic manager. Shaw writes this of the cold war era: "Total war became a model not only of state power but of economic and social organization" (p. 106). In the cold war logic of deterrence, proliferation of arms meant that "states became strategic organizers of national economies" (p. 107). Through military investment, states (the United States in particular) developed what is commonly referred to as the mil-itary industrial complex. Military alliance with the Western bloc brought with it economic integration of its member states into an economic network led by the United States. As the strongest military industrial economy, the United States continues to head the former Western bloc association of nations both militarily and economically, and diverse national interests negotiate to participate in the U.S. economy (Held et al., 1999) . The military industrial complex thus indicates the first point of contact that I will elaborate here: state to state.
Economic Regulation
Often referred to as the primary motivation for globalization, the above description of the international military order shows that economic regulation of international exchange would be a necessity given the vastness of the military industrial complex. Over three decades, the world spent $21 trillion in military trade (Held et al., 1999) . We can expect this figure to increase dramatically with post-September 11, 2001, and post-Iraq invasion military budget increases in the United States and throughout the globe. With an escalating need to seek raw materials and resources outside of given territories, the prominence of international trade regulatory bodies, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and regional trade agreements, such as GATT, would be inevitable. Facilitating the continued escalation of international trade requires constant attention to building and maintaining financial communications infrastructures. In the contemporary world, this motivation tends toward two main phenomena: the construction of digital communications networks and regulation of transfers through those networks.
The physical infrastructure of the global financial system gets little attention from academics, even though it is a major concern for states and financial institutions. The movement of financial information has inspired incredible advances in computer technology and policy, though the aesthetic impact is admittedly much less sensational than the eruption of the World Wide Web. This does not make the cultural implications any less profound. Perhaps the most visible indication of the digitization of money transfers is in the stock exchange. Several years ago, stock exchanges began to enhance and replace the traditional pit outcry system with sophisticated computer technology, changing the nature of the stock exchange. Possibly even more important to global trade has been the development of Real-Time Gross Settlement Systems (RTGS) that are used to conduct exchanges between large financial institutions. 6 The Canadian incarnation, known as the Large Value Transfer System (LVTS), is considered the "core of the national payments system" (Dingle, 2000) . A perusal of World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and document archives reveals a quiet but ongoing concern for the proliferation of digital payment systems throughout the world. The impact of this growing digital communications infrastructure is deeply felt. According to Boisvert and Gaa (2001) , Innovations in communications and information technology and the related globalization of financial markets have created the potential for important changes to the structure of Canadian equity markets. Established marketplaces can now compete more effectively on an inter-regional and international basis. At the same time, reduced costs have lowered the barriers to entry faced by new competitors known as alternative trading systems (ATSs). In response to this heightened competition, established Canadian stock exchanges have taken measures to improve market quality.
The terrain of financial exchanges is rapidly being reshaped. Newfound abilities to trade electronically on a global scale are changing the nature of global economics. Andrew Crockett of the Bank for International Settlements observes the following:
The impact of technical innovations and deregulations on banking and the rest of the financial sector has been profound. The range of products and services have widened markedly. Intermediation costs have declined enormously. Financial transactions have grown rapidly in relation to GDP. (Crockett, 2001) The increased capacities of the global financial network most basically result in the ability to instantly move larger amounts of money than ever before to any destination in the network at almost any time. Access to the financial network through new and innovative technologies are allowing more people (however petty their involvement on the individual level) to participate in global exchanges. There is no doubt that the continued expansion of the digital network throughout the world represents a very material process with vast economic impacts. Ironically, one of the main causes of economic impacts stems from the dematerialization of money itself.
Cohen (in press) describes a new geography of money resulting from the digitization of currency. As the electronic transfer web proliferates, the domain of exchanges becomes deterritorialized, located everywhere and nowhere at the same time and at all times. At any moment, from almost any place in the world hooked into the system, one may make digital money transfers. The proliferation in the number and size of exchanges is radically changing the nature of economics both nationally and internationally. Writers such as Castells (2000) have theorized this as resulting in a new information economy, whereby the transfer of information and its material and knowledge-based infrastructures have become central features of the economic base. Although domestic national markets retain the strongest share of GDP, national markets are "deeply connected to the world market" (Castells, 2000, p. 95) through the global network of the information economy. The motivation of capitalist expansion is thus met by the increase in productivity through speed and mobil-ity afforded by digital currency. This leads to the second phenomenon in global economic motivation.
Diminishing natural restrictions on time and space of payments is inspiring calls for new rules to keep markets under control. The efficiency of transfers presents the potential for the very rapid collapse of markets. Contagion in the context of the global financial network could prove devastating if transfers are allowed to go unrestricted (Cohen, in press ). Soros (1998) identifies the danger as "the free, competitive capital markets that keep private capital moving unceasingly around the globe in a search for the highest profits and, supposedly, the most efficient allocation of the world's investment and savings" (p. 55). Among other threats, rampant currency speculation raises the specter of political instability (Crotty & Epstein, 1996) . The result is a call to develop and implement a global protocol on transfers. There are historical precedents for regulatory mechanisms.
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One significant difference in the present context is the number of actors in the global financial arena.
The potential for crisis in the global market is a topic for discussion in numerous international forums. Similar to its international RTGS counterparts, Canada's LVTS plan mainly outlines the policy rules that make it operational and secure. The infamous G8 and other international trade bodies meet regularly to discuss how to regulate the global market and to strategize over how to manage domestic markets in the global context. Sachs (1998) maintains that this regulatory process can only be successful if it is inclusive of more than just the most affluent economies. The legitimacy of the dominating economic discourse depends on recognizing the plurality of the global financial arena and seeking input from all major financial players. Not just national interests are involved here. As always, corporate input into the terms of globalizing capital must be recognized.
The World Trade Organization, the Free Trade Area of the Americas, and numerous other forums bring together the heads of states and heads of transnational corporations. Though states facilitate the transfers of payments and enforce policy decisions through central banks and other mechanisms, it is well known that the economic earnings and investment clout of several transnational corporations now exceed that of many smaller nations' GDP. This type of economic hegemony makes inclusion of corporate interests in the negotiating process commonsensical. Here, I identify another point of contact between actors in the globalization process. States and corporations negotiate with each other to define the terms of global trade policy. Aside from the obvious benefits of global access to goods and resources, the opening of global markets is an important motivation for the corporate world. The diffusion of trade goods on the world market is epitomized by what is often called the "globalization of culture."
The Culture and Leisure Industries
Alongside the proliferation and regulation of the economic communications infrastructure comes a corresponding phenomenon in the commercial communications industries. Globalization of communications, introduction of multinational corporate news and entertainment media into previously media-sovereign national territories, is commonly said to be the primary step in the commodification, homogenization, and domination of culture by brand-based consumerism. Through an enculturating advertising and propaganda process, globalized corporate media are said to embed the North American consumerist ethos into the people comprising the markets they move into, while at the same time undermining the integrity of the national and local media industries. As mentioned in the introduction, this global diffusion of products comprises the most popular type of cultural analysis regarding globalization. Having already commented on its main thrust, my discussion here of this motivating factor will be brief.
Globalizing the political economy of communications is a profitable enterprise. Some of the very same hardware that facilitates immediate transfers of finance and capital also facilitates the rebroadcast in new markets of content already paid for in its first run through the North American market. On the other side of the coin, the influx of capital that opening borders to global media and cultural industries can inspire is too tempting for states to resist. Reregulation of national cultural industries under the buzz word convergence is now a commonplace phenomenon. I will briefly expand on the concept of convergence.
Properly understood, convergence refers to the integration of formerly separate media into one point of service; for example, the telephone, television, and radio converged into one computing device through the Internet. The phenomenon at first seems to be unique, but in reality, convergence has long been artificially prevented through government legislation to establish competition and prevent monopolization in communications industries. However, the contemporary context of network technology and communications industries requires the development of digital signal carriers to keep up with the evolution of computer technology itself. Governments have been looking to the private sector to develop this infrastructure of the digital society, but rather than delivering the information superhighway to citizens' homes, corporate interests have instead focused on taking advantage of the hyperbole of the global digital discourse by simply negotiating for that which they were previously denied. For example, the President's Information Technology Advisory Committee (1998) reported that companies simply will not invest in long-term goals that may not realize a profit for a decade or more. Even so, this has not stopped corporate interests from effectively using the language of digital exploration to achieve their own short-term capitalist ends. In a way, it is a poetic justice for the very industries that were, in many cases, artificially legislated into narrow definitions of service in the first place. In terms of political economy, convergence through the language of deregulation represents the fulfillment of what has been possible all along. What is said to be making this imperative for the communications industries is the globalization of audiences and through them, advertising markets. The introduction of cheap foreign content into formerly closed domestic markets is causing a crisis in competition for advertising dollars. Taras (1999) points out that "the digital revolution is the key to convergence" (p. 63), while at the same time, the proliferation of consumption options is giving rise to ever more specialized content for targeted audiences (p. 67). As Garnham describes, "the mass media are constituted out of a process in which media companies produce audiences and deliver them to advertisers" (Mosco, 1996, p. 148) . This production of audiences is achieved through the commodification and consumption of symbols that are said to convey opportunities for subjective consumers to construct their identity. Mosco (1996) writes the following:
The process of commodification is reduced to the free-floating circulation of symbols, an outcome obscured by the misappropriation of political economy's conceptual apparatus, itself reduced to a set of free-floating terms, torn from their historically constituted and specific meanings, to add weight to an otherwise light argument. (p. 156) Referred to as branding by writers such as Klein (2000) , commodities are marketed as symbols of a particular aspect of personal identity, such as being cool. Through consumption of specific brands that are marketed as having specific meanings, the consumers of particular commodities are grouped into specific audiences typecast by class and status and are then sold to advertisers (Harvey, 2002 ). An obvious sale of audiences to advertisers is seen in the newspaper business, where corporations compete by catering to specific classes of readers by emphasizing a particular expertise. 8 The convergence of technology and the globalization of entertainment markets are used as an argument to reregulate the communications industry to allow the formation of larger and larger conglomerates and multinationalization through corporate mergers and buyouts. The promise of effective and lucrative cross-media merchandising of brands through control of the production and distribution networks (Mosco, 1996, p. 194 ) is a powerful motivation for corporate lobbying. The potential to indoctrinate previously inaccessible consumers through globalizing media (p.148) is a strong motivation for related corporate interests to back up the corporate media's demands. Meanwhile, the tensions inherent in the relationships between corporations, the wage slaves that make branded consumerism possible, and conscientious consumer objections of their treatment by corporations forms a third point of contact in the globalization process.
The Human Condition and Market Stability
Addressing instability arising from the resistance of producers and consumers to exploitation by multinational corporations is the fourth motivating factor for states in the articulation of globalization. The globalization of capital results in an entirely new set of labor and consumer relations arising from the modification or termination of formerly established terms. Mosco (1996) writes the following:
Capital, in its own various and contested manifestations, must actively construct audiences as it constructs labor, but even as it does so, both audiences and labor construct themselves by deciding, within a social field whose terms of engagement are primarily set by capital, how to activate their audience and labor power. (p. 149) Capital constructs the arena and parameters of the discourse within which negotiation over the human condition can take place. This is an important aspect of this particular motivating issue in that it creates even further exclusion and marginalization of certain peoples who outright refuse the discourse of capital. I will look at this in more detail further on as a subset of motivations. First, I will explore how the assimilation of organizations resistant to the corporatization of society into the dominant arena works through the motivation for control and social stability.
Earlier I asserted that the present supranational organizations governing globalization do not meet the criteria for statehood. Even so, the phenomenon of assimilating international nongovernmental organizations and other social movement organizations into the globalization arena takes on the characteristics of a global public sphere. As already described, international trade bodies define the policies that become articulated by states as globalization. Assimilating the strongest voices of resistance into the process serves two purposes: First, it legitimates the discourse of globalization, and second, it weakens the effectiveness of such organizations to challenge the dominant discourse. The result is similar to Gramsci's (1997) description of the extension of state power through the use of civil society (Althusser, 1971) . In this process, a definition of legitimate protest is determined (i.e., sanctioned forms of nongovernmental or noncorporate input into the globalization process). Nonsanctioned protest is maintained as a deviant and oppositional Other, as outlined earlier. Without mincing words, Cammack (2002) bluntly calls this process "making poverty work."
One can be reasonably sure that true to a Malthusian and liberal morality, the overriding motivation of globalizing capital is to create wealth (for some more than others), not poverty. The poverty resulting from the process of exploiting labor and forcing structural adjustments that end social programs for the poor is justified as an unfortunate but inevitable byproduct of competi-tion. To manage the resulting social upheavals that might threaten the stability of markets, it is prudent to minimize the extent of suffering that poverty causes through humanitarian programs. However well intentioned inviting international NGOs who are meant to deliver such programs into trade summits may appear on the surface, Cammack (2002) states it plainly:
Behind [the World Bank's] proclaimed wish to see an end to poverty lies a diametrically opposite intention: to impose universally the conditions through which poverty is created and maintained. Far from wanting to abolish poverty, the World Bank wants poverty to work for capitalism. (p. 194) Impoverished peoples throughout the world are seen primarily as a source of cheap labor. Programs meant to help indoctrinate impoverished people into the global labor pool for exploitation by multinational corporations are described as "assets of the poor" (p. 199). Once successfully entrapped by the capitalist system-effectively proletariatized-such peoples are wage slaves that depend on the global system for their survival. They are subject to the whims of the global market just as any other workers throughout the world and are subjected to the same barrage of consumerist propaganda through the global mass media. They become part of the global productive and consumptive force.
Having been assimilated into the process of defining the terms of oppression, NGOs such as labor organizations are no longer in a position to challenge the discourse it has helped legitimate (Drainville, 2002) . The hegemony of the capitalist discourse is strongly felt in the labor movement as workers' concerns over job stability in one part of the world clash with people's need to work in another location. For example, Martin and Ross (1999) explain how European trade unions have been active in helping the European unionization process along. Their presence in the European Union is not strong enough to seriously influence the outcome, and even as they work on behalf of their members to maintain their national support bases, they must respond to challenges that arise in the opening of labor markets and policy adjustments that they themselves have had a hand in defining. This is not to say that labor is satisfied with the outcome of their bargaining but rather to highlight the weak position they find themselves in. They must play along to remain legitimate, but in doing so, they seem to slowly lose their relevance. Passy (1999) describes the bind that assimilated NGOs and other internationalized social movements find themselves in as a "two-level game" (p. 169). Negotiation for social change must take place on two levels: national and supranational. However, when an organization has participated in the definition of policy on the supranational level, it weakens their ability to challenge these same policies on a national or supranational level (Rucht, 1999) . Rather than mounting effective challenges to the exploitation of workers, international NGOs and labor organizations may in fact find themselves in the position of helping implement and enforce policies. At the least, they may find themselves sidelined while the nation-state represses and assimilates internal dissent. Here, I identify a subgenre of motivating issues within the broad rubric of the human condition. Negotiation and implementation of policy indicates a point of contact between human rights representatives and states.
Implementation and Enforcement of Policy
It is clear that in the globalized market, different conditions exist in different locations (Huws, 2001) . Both productive and consumptive conditions will be subject to the particularities of specific nations. There will be a diversity of human needs throughout the globe and as such, different motivations for resistance in different places. However, at least one constant is observable throughout the globalizing world. There is resistance to the implementation of austere social policies everywhere. As mentioned earlier, the forms of resistance may be markedly different from place to place, depending on the circumstances of the people. What is more consistent is the globalization of the repressive state apparatuses.
The globalization of repressive systems has been part and parcel of the spread of globalization. Through international sharing of techniques and research, importation of expertise, and colonial style imposition of repressive apparatuses, similar control tactics are being employed by national police forces throughout the world to repress internal dissent (McCarthy, McPhail, & Crist, 1999) . The irony here is that the very organizations that are meant to represent issues of dissent to the state may themselves participate in the policing of unsatisfied citizens. Withdrawing financial support from recalcitrant organizations, as the Canadian Auto Workers union did to the Ontario Coalition Against Poverty a couple of years ago, acts as a form of ideological repression. As Gramsci (1997) and Althusser (1971) observed, a civil society indoctrinated into the state becomes part of the repressive apparatus. An equally blatant moment of hegemony occurred during the Quebec City 2001 Free Trade Area of the Americas summit, when a large labor-organized march literally turned its masses away from the summit area where the state's repressive forces were quashing the expression of dissent. These are small, localized examples of what plays out on a daily basis throughout the world but of which we seldom hear.
Without the protection labor traditionally confers to demonstrators through their ability to turn out large numbers of marchers, the repressive forces of the state have been escalating their tactics with impunity. The past few years have seen new precedents in police repression in the contemporary Western world, with little or no outcry from the sanctioned international public. In Sweden, police fired on antiglobalization demonstrators with live ammunition. In Genoa, Italy, a protester was shot dead by police. Numerous people have been killed in demonstrations against government austerity in Argentina, where the dismal failure of neoliberalism is tragically playing out. Post-September 11, 2001, legislation has made it possible to consider anything interpretable as anti-Americanism grounds for U.S. Intelligence involvement, and snatch squads acting in concert with the mass arrest and detention of protesters have quickly evolved to become a normal part of civil demonstrations in the socalled land of freedom.
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Here is a clear point of contact between the repressive state apparatuses and people (and their representatives by proxy) disenfranchised in the globalization process. Resisting the implementation of policy or demonstrating on behalf of those whose voices remain absent from negotiations is becoming a deadly proposition. As Drainville (2002) describes it, such demonstrations have been turned into "spectacles of [state] authority" (p. 19).
Globalizing Solidarity and Resistance
In spite of the assimilation of NGOs into the governing bodies of globalization, many are recognizing the need and formation of global resistance beyond sanctioned dissidence (Brecher, Costello, & Smith, 2000; Panitch, 2001, p. 370) . Drainville (2002) has identified the emergence of a distinct people's movement apart from the assimilated, professional representatives of the people. This nonsanctioned movement of disenfranchised peoples and spokespersons does not believe the incorporation of NGOs into trade summits will result in a gentler globalization of capital. Rather, as Gindin (2001) writes, This movement has grasped capitalism as a totality and has dared to question its legitimacy. The issue is . . . the amorality of capitalism, its narrow commodification of humanity and nature and therefore negation of our collective potential, its centralization of economic, social, and political power-nationally and internationally-and consequent corruption of any meaningful popular democracy. (p. 309)
As McCarthy et al. (1999) point out, the globalization of protest has meant the sharing of tactics of resistance along with the exchange of information. A global network of activists standing on guard for one another is beginning to emerge, building international solidarity. However, at the same time, Drainville (2002) describes that the very strength of the protest movement, its looseness and fluidity, fails to move it entirely into the realm of revolution (p. 34).
Remember that revolution in a postmodern analysis comes from a fundamental disruption of the rules of discourse. Although much of the fervor of the nonsanctioned antiglobalization movement is meant to point out the absurdity and inherent cruelty of the globalization process, it is difficult to discern a solid challenge to the foundational rules of the globalization discourse itself. As Brecher et al. (2000) write, an alternative global transformation "requires a multilevel strategy and program to impose new rules on the global economy while transferring wealth and power to ordinary people-a worldwide economic and political democratization" (p. xi). In other words, the global economy is not going to simply disappear, and the world will not simply become a more democratic place just because we protest in the streets of Seattle or Quebec City or Genoa or Washington. To be effective in the long run, the campaign against global capital must be much more than the "swarm of mosquitoes" described by Klein (2002, p. 11) . It must present exactly what movements such as the Zapatistas-so eagerly romanticized but misunderstood by aspiring revolutionaries-feel they already have: a way of living worth protecting.
The quest to identify nonleadership in the mask of Subcomandante Marcos has led many great minds in the North to miss the point entirely. The leadership of the Maya, through community councils, is in the communities themselves that have acted as the embodiment of knowledge and guiding voices of the people since, as it is often put, time immemorial. What is being threatened by globalization in Chiapas and other traditional indigenous territories in places such as Colombia, Brazil, and Panama, aside from the obvious material means of survival (meager as they are), are the very structures of knowledge that make such cultures unique and precious in the first place. The lesson to be learned from the Maya is not just how to resist but the understanding that it is possible to actually be something other than the role defined by capital and industrialism in general. This is a fundamental challenge to the rules of capitalist discourse in which the state seeks to define all aspects of existence in its territory. It is important not to simply romanticize Maya society as a more natural alternative to our advanced capitalist society or to simple-mindedly consider their way of life a handy replacement for advanced capitalism. It may be somewhat possible to adapt the Maya's Zapatista model of political organization in the North on a community level, but obviously, it is not viable to relate the everyday agrarian life of the Maya in Chiapas to everyday life in the postindustrial North. It is almost unthinkable for us in the North, and especially in metropolitan areas, to consider holding nightly community meetings that because of the demand for complete consensus, run into the early morning, such as I witnessed in the Lacandona jungle. Rather, it is up to us in the North to develop our own unique way of being that we can be satisfied with. Above all, the point is not to simply have a swarm of mosquitoes suck the blood from a beast-this would only be to gorge ourselves on the blood of capitalism-but to be an entirely different animal. This way of being would practice democratization through self-determination in all social systems and contexts. Hardt and Negri (2000) suggest that this way of being is to be found in "a new nomad horde, a new race of barbarians [that] will arise to invade or evacuate Empire" (p. 213). Such people will already be everywhere in the system, defined by their being against it, even while participating in it. Recognizing myself and numerous other people that I know in their description, I humbly offer a personal response to the call for a new way of being, an affirmation that we, the "beings against," do indeed exist (see Appendix B). mance, performativity (Denzin, 2003) , and critical pedagogy (Darder, Baltodano, & Torres, 2003) offer us an avenue through which to understand and reconstruct ourselves into more fully human subjects (Freire, 1989) , or perhaps there is something yet to become more fully developed from the affinity group and spokes council model of most antiglobalization organizing. Although the fruition of these and other important projects remain to be seen, there is cause for optimism in the fact that the need for alternatives indigenous to the North is taken quite seriously. Of course, the disenfranchised in other parts of the world cannot wait and are simply not waiting for the North to transform itself from within.
Movements such as the Zapatistas highlight a point of contact between the disenfranchised but globally coordinated resistance to capital and the military force that I started my description with. As more than 500 years of colonialism have proven, the true challenge of the fundamental logic of capital will undoubtedly be subjected to the full force of the capitalist states' repressive apparatus, but through the resilient practices of an everyday life differently motivated than the dominating logic, resistance to oppression and exploitation continues.
Seeking Democracy
I began this article with the affirmation that a cultural analysis of globalization should take into consideration the state as a cultural artifact. Above, I have profiled the perversity of the state's reach in repressive force and ideology. As such, it is only fitting one should question the ability of Western society to, in fact, incorporate the practices of liberty that Foucault (1999) and others illustrated are literally programmed out of us. As Held et al. (1999) write, Whether the cultural traditions and resources exist to support the deepening democratization not just of nation-states but of the wider regional and global order is an open question. Even though processes of globalization may be physically uniting the globe, we have seen that they are not necessarily engendering that sense of global community on which the legitimacy of global democratic governance would depend. Indeed, many thinkers argue that accelerating globalization merely intensifies and generates conflicts as the nations of the world seek to secure their interests in the "global neighborhood." (p. 451)
The imposition and maintenance of global capitalism has meant that military oppression is a phenomenon widely felt in much of the world. I am certainly not suggesting that military campaigns are unique to capitalism but rather that the present empire-building projects, military and otherwise, are enabled by and organized according to capitalist principals and promote the U.S. model of capitalist liberal democracy as their highest moral goal and justification, regardless of what indigenous political and economic systems might be displaced and the violence thereby incurred by civilian populations. The histori-cal precedents set in Guatemala, Chile, Argentina, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Haiti, and Panama, among other nations, show a clear will to the use of deadly force by the United States and those in its sphere of influence. The present conflict in Iraq and the subtler but no less deadly expansionist campaigns in Chiapas and Colombia are demonstrations of a continuation of the U.S. empire-building project. Overseas conflicts such as the destruction of Serbia, Afghanistan, and the U.S.-led campaign in Iraq ensure the dominance of U.S. and Western capital in the redevelopment of those nations' infrastructures. As the imposition of austere neoliberal policies in South Africa by the once-leftist African National Congress government shows, the perverse abilities of global capital are indeed formidable.
Of course, the underlying theme of a challenge to capital is always the reappropriation and development of one's own abilities-self-determination if you will. Such self-determination must be extended to having a meaningful voice in the discourses that affect one's life. This is the democratic principle. The governing bodies of globalized trade are not democratic nor is democracy their concern (Dahl, 1999) . In fact, history shows that these governing bodies will use very undemocratic methods to have their way. Popular rhetoric, the commonsense discourse, tells us that the state is powerless to halt the globalization of capital, that globalization is good for everyone, that social responsibility is too costly for governments to maintain, that competition is good, that poverty for some is inevitable in the process of creating wealth for others, and that resistance to capital is futile. The description of globalization and the state in this article indicate that another discourse is possible.
I have indicated several points of contact between several actors in the discourse of globalization. I have described that the state is clearly a primary and powerful actor in the articulation of globalizing capital. I have identified the goal of resistance as interrupting the dominating logic that guides the policies of globalization. What remains is to develop and enact a praxis and language of dignity and freedom. Explicating the state as a plurality of interests presents many fronts open to disruption. As Panitch (2001) has written, A sustained mobilization against the institutions of globalization will have to eventually offer a strategic vision for a different order. Until such a vision gains some currency, legitimacy will continue to be lent to the institutions of globalization by labour, NGOs and Third World elites who see no practical alternative to them. (p. 380) The task is clear and multifaceted. A formidable resistance to global capital can come from strategizing to develop and insert a discourse of self-determination (a particular form of democracy) into various points of the state apparatuses. This approach is not just a resistance to capital but the building of an entirely new logic by which to conduct our daily lives. It should take every opportunity to cleverly subvert the presently dominating terms of existence in this society. It should recognize an individual agency beyond narrow practices of production and consumption. It should seek to remove the position of the deviant Other altogether from the construct of identity and instead develop affirmations of the subjective self as a practitioner of freedom, thereby building solidarity. Above all, it should insert compassion, dignity, and celebration as the principals guiding social relations. Finally, a strategic vision will have to look generations beyond the here and now for its inspiration and point of reference and into an optimistic future. Such optimism is itself subversive to the discourse of capital, meaning we have already begun by spreading just this idea alone.
Not even simulacra can resist reification (nor punctuation). There is nothing left of my lineage but reification. My genealogy of reification reveals that my being is a philosophical deconstruct, an imagined form navigating my own ideals. I have no back-up. I operate only in real time live environment(s). I am philologically eco-system(at)ic. Modernism finally managed to create the perpetual motion machine, which I embody: 'Postmodernism' ( . . . sincerity = irony = truth ∴ sincerity = irony = truth ∴ sincerity = irony = truth . . . ). I am exactly that type of technological apparatus. Acceleration is the speed at which the world unfolds itself before me. Reaching with networked appendages, I consume everything from everywhere and everytime, aware that my victuals are torn directly from the mouths of babes, yet powerless to give them back to them. My unborn children are already starving. I struggle to feed them, but alas, my nipples too are just sexualized illusion. For them I strive to softly dissolve the war machine that has silently annihilated every moment of my own existence (or was that all just thunder and lightning?). Midnight is the time of obliteration. I have a pain in my neck for which the only treatment is a transcendental spiritual practice. Once one transcends the body-the material-one learns to love such pain as one of the feelings of embodiment. Can I nourish children with transcendence? Can I teach them to love their own hunger? I am the rhetorical answer to my own irony. In such condition, how can I be anything but sincere? (Be careful how you read that.) I can only be optimistic, but on a moment to moment basis. In dreaming life, I find the eternal, infinitely optimistic moment, followed by the next . . . Eternity is incubation, metamorphosis the funeral of pessimism. Moment to moment, I imagine possibility. Moment to moment, speeding by, time is torn directly from death itself. Moment to moment, I recall that I dream that I love someone . . . J Moment to moment . . . tick tick tick . . . is a heartbeat real? (I know in spite of the story, s/he will suckle the orphans, because only s/he can). Moment to moment, time out of place (so far away, yet every nanosecond I'm touched by networked being). I can't/won't/may not dwell here more than a moment. It's time to move on . . . time to re-(en/in/imagine)form. Time to re-(en)gender being, and reanimate. Time to mobilize (accelerate). Time to split the (atomized) earth. Time to feed tomorrow.
Notes
1. For example, see Bagdikian, 1992; Mosco, 1996; Golding & Murdock, 2002; Shiller, 1989; and Winter, 1997. 2. As explicated throughout the work of Michel Foucault. 3. For example, Tsoukalas (1999) discuses "new developing forms of articulation between the various state apparatuses and the professional political personnel occupying their summits, on the one hand, and the representatives of big capital on the other" (p. 58). Gramsci (1997) pointed to political parties themselves as a source of pluralism within the state (pp. 227, 252-253) .
4. Hegemony plays a strong role here, as shall stand out further on in discussions of military and economic motivations.
5. This is most notable in cases of bulimia and other eating disorders in Western society.
6. For an overview, see Bank for International Settlement Systems (1997). 7. For example, one historical precedent is the Bretton Woods agreement. See Helleiner, 1994. 8. For example, in the Toronto market, the Globe & Mail appeals to the business class by emphasizing political and corporate news, the Toronto Star appeals to the upper middle class by emphasizing liberal-democratic issues, and the Toronto Sun appeals to the working class by emphasizing sports and entertainment.
9. The examples given here are not chosen to represent a total picture of antiglobalization protest throughout the globe. Rather, these incidents reported in the mainstream media demonstrate a trend of escalating state violence in relation to unsanctioned civil protest in Europe and North America.
10. In discussing an earlier draft of this article, it was suggested that I provide a narrative of how a new way of being might be experienced. Although they might seem out of place in an article on globalization and the state, these prose (Appendix B) are the result of such inquires.
